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Abstract
Under modern law, federal legislation is subject to “rational basis
review” under the doctrinal rubric of “substantive due process.” That
construction of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is
notoriously difficult to justify as a matter of original constitutional
meaning. Something functionally very similar to substantive due process,
however, is easily justifiable as a matter of original constitutional
meaning once one understands that the Constitution, for interpretative
purposes, is best seen as a kind of fiduciary instrument. Fiduciary
instruments operate against a background of legal norms that notably
include a duty of care on the part of agents. All federal actors under the
Constitution exercise delegated authority (from “We the People”) as
agents, and thus all federal actors under the Constitution are bound by a
duty of care. This duty has much affinity with the business judgment rule
of corporate law, in that the scope of the duty of federal actors, as gleaned
from eighteenth-century agency and corporate law, probably does not
exceed avoidance of gross negligence. This Article examines the contours
of this duty of care that forms part of the background of every
constitutional grant of power.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you execute a power of attorney giving other people
authority over a portion of your affairs, such as management of some of
your assets or control over your health-care decisions. Or suppose that
you yourself are made the guardian of your ailing grandparent through
such a document. How would you expect the designated agents in these
scenarios to carry out their tasks? How would the law expect them (or
you) to do so?
The law’s answer is probably very close to most people’s intuitions:
A power of attorney creates a principal/agent, or fiduciary, relationship
in which the agent exercising delegated authority is bound to act in
accordance with the direct instructions of the principal and must abide by
a set of default fiduciary obligations to the principal, such as a duty to
exercise personal judgment, a duty of loyalty to the principal, and, most
importantly for present purposes, a duty of care when acting on behalf of
the principal.1 Accordingly, both you and the law would expect the agent
under such a fiduciary instrument to manage the principal’s affairs
prudently, thoughtfully, and carefully, and the law would enforce that
expectation with stiff penalties.2 The same expectation, again backed by
the threat of stiff legal sanctions, holds across an entire family of
fiduciary relationships, such as child/guardian, businessperson/factor,
and corporation/officer.3 A fiduciary’s duty of care is one of the most
basic principles of agency law.
It is also one of the most basic principles underlying the U.S.
Constitution. While all of the prior examples of fiduciary obligations
refer to private law rather than public law, the law of agency is
pertinent—and, indeed, crucial—to understanding the relationship
between the U.S. government and the people over whom it exercises
jurisdiction.
Federal officials, from the President to members of Congress to
federal judges, receive constitutionally delegated discretionary authority
over a wide range of subjects. The constitutional text allocates various
powers to governmental actors, and it prescribes mechanisms of oversight
and supervision of those actors ranging from elections to impeachment
proceedings. The document, however, does not generally describe in any
detail the manner in which discretionary authority must be exercised.

1. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011) (describing various fiduciary
relationships and the fiduciary duties generally associated with them).
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8477(e)(1)(A) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012).
3. For an overview of commonly recognized fiduciary relationships, see Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1983).
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Nonetheless, as a matter of the Constitution’s original meaning, 4 all
federal powers must be implemented with the thoughtfulness, care, and
prudence that would be required of a private-law fiduciary in analogous
circumstances. Translating that fiduciary duty into ordinary language: All
exercises of federal power must be reasonable. This conclusion does not
derive from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, which
as an interpretative matter likely cannot sustain any such load, or indeed
from any other express constitutional provision. It derives instead from
the very nature of the Constitution.
In a book from the University Press of Kansas entitled “A Great
Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution,5 we
demonstrate at length that the Constitution is most accurately viewed, for
purposes of its interpretation, as a kind of fiduciary instrument—and
specifically as a “great power of attorney,” to use the language of the
founding-era giant James Iredell.6 The legal maker of the Constitution,
identified in the Preamble as “We the People,”7 purported to entrust
4. By “original meaning,” we mean the communicative signals intended to be conveyed
by the Constitution’s legal author, who is identified by the document itself as the hypothetical
entity “We the People.” See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could
Fleming Be Right this Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2016); Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 49 (2006). As an
operational matter, that intention effectively translates into the meaning that would have been
attributed to the document by a hypothetical reasonable observer at the time of the document’s
making. See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV.
1111, 1119, 1136 (2015). We do not claim that original meaning must be the only, or even a
relevant, determinant of real-world decisions. That is a claim concerning adjudicative theory, and
our claims are limited solely to interpretative theory. On the crucial but oft-overlooked distinction
between interpretative theory (what a document means) and adjudicative theory (how decisions
regarding a document should be made), see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313–14 (2013); Gary Lawson, Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of
Interpretation?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2143, 2155–58 (2017). Moreover, we do not claim that
fiduciary theory provides insights into real-world decisions as a matter of positive political theory
or normative grounding for government as a matter of normative political theory. See generally
Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014)
(identifying many problems with using fiduciary theory as a normative foundation for real-world
decisions); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE
L.J. 1820 (2016). Our claims, as we have said, strictly concern the communicative meaning of a
specific eighteenth-century document. We speak as lawyers, not as moral or political theorists.
5. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING
THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).
6. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1797 148–
49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (“[The Constitution] is a declaration of particular powers by
the people to their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be considered as a great power
of attorney, under which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given.”) (emphasis
added).
7. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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management of some portion of its affairs to various specified agents,
who must exercise their power on behalf of the designated beneficiaries,
which the Preamble identifies as We the People and its “posterity.” 8 In
the book, we show that the case for viewing the Constitution as some
species of fiduciary instrument is overwhelming. From classical theory,
with which all educated members of the founding generation would have
been familiar, through English country-party thought through foundingera republicanism, a fiduciary conception of government infused late
eighteenth-century political and legal thought. The principal drafters of
the Constitution—the members of the Committee of Detail—were
private-law lawyers (Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, John
Rutledge, and James Wilson) familiar with drafting agency instruments
and a businessperson (Nathaniel Gorham) familiar with applying them.9
The general public in that era was far more acquainted with fiduciary
instruments than is the general public today. The more one looks at
founding-era fiduciary documents, the more one sees them reflected in
the U.S. Constitution.
There were many kinds of eighteenth-century agency instruments,
including powers of attorney and corporate charters, from which
provisions of the Constitution could have been—and rather clearly
were—drawn. In the book, we argue that there is a stronger case for
seeing the Constitution as akin to a power of attorney than for seeing it
as some other kind of fiduciary instrument, such as a corporate charter,
though that case is considerably less decisive than is the case for seeing
the Constitution in agency terms of some kind. We also show that once
the Constitution is seen in general agency terms, the background rules for
ascertaining the meaning of the document must be drawn, at least in large
measure, from agency law. How one interprets10 a document depends on
8.
We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union, to
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
Id.
9. See generally William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197
(2012) (describing an enlightening account of the work of the Committee of Detail). For an
account of the familiarity of the Committee with agency law, see Robert G. Natelson, The
Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 84, 85–86 (2010).
10. We use the word “interpret” to mean “ascertain the intended meaning of.” It is possible
to use the word “interpret” in other fashions, but we limit our use strictly to the positive
ascertainment of communicative intentions.
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what kind of document one is interpreting. An agency-law instrument is
best interpreted in light of agency law, just as a poem is best interpreted
in light of the conventions associated with poetry and a shopping list is
best interpreted in light of the conventions typically employed by the
author of the shopping list.
This Article takes those demonstrations of the fiduciary character of
the Constitution and the implications of that character for discerning the
Constitution’s meaning as jumping-off points and explores one specific
but crucial interpretative consequence of viewing the Constitution in
fiduciary or agency-law terms. Put simply: If agency-law instruments
entail that agents are bound by a duty of care, and if the Constitution is
best seen as an agency-law instrument of some kind, then constitutional
agents are bound by duties of care. The conclusion, we think, would have
been obvious to a reasonable eighteenth-century audience.
For purposes of this Article, it does not matter whether one analogizes
the Constitution to a power of attorney, a corporate charter, or any other
specific kind of fiduciary instrument (though that distinction might matter
in other contexts). If the Constitution is best understood and interpreted
as any kind of agency instrument at all, it follows inexorably that there
are unenumerated but nonetheless constitutionally grounded limitations
on virtually all of the authority exercised by governmental actors. Those
constraints affect the manner in which those powers must be exercised,
and they determine on whose behalf the exercise must take place.
Understanding the Constitution as a species of agency instrument
provides at least an outline for understanding how and why these
constraints are present. When agents receive delegated authority, they
receive that authority subject to a set of presumptive legal obligations to
exercise their authority in a certain way and on behalf of certain
beneficiaries.11 Acceptance of the role of agent, as understood in
founding-era English common law, entailed a commitment to provide
service to the principal. Agents cannot use their power as they please,
because the power is not really their own; they are legally constrained by
the very fact that they are acting as agents, not in their personal capacities
as private individuals. The agents’ duties of, inter alia, care and loyalty
form part of the background law of agency, and those duties will govern
relationships created by any particular agency instrument unless there is
something in the instrument that says otherwise. Nothing in the
Constitution says otherwise.
Modern law, to a modest extent, recognizes this overarching
requirement of reasonableness in federal action, but it tends to locate it in
the textually unpromising interstices of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause and it does not necessarily calibrate the
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 8.01–.12 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 6 [], Art. 2

1390

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

requirement of reasonableness to the precise duty of care that the
Constitution actually contemplates. Under the rubric of “substantive due
process,” all federal legislation must meet a minimum requirement of
rationality, though that minimum is so low that any imaginable rationale
is considered sufficient to sustain federal action unless the action
implicates some judicially favored interests.12 Under a fiduciary
understanding of the Constitution, the standard of care may well require
more than what passes for rationality under modern law, that standard
does not necessarily vary with the character of the interest involved, and
the standard of care applies to all institutions of the national government
and not simply to Congress. The Constitution’s substantive rationality
requirement runs far deeper than modern law acknowledges.
In this Article, we consider the duties of care required by the
Constitution of the President, the federal courts, and Congress when those
agents carry out their delegated tasks. We devote most of our attention to
Congress, partly because we have at least indirectly explored the duties
of the President and the federal courts elsewhere,13 and partly because the
congressional duty of care presents the best vehicle for considering the
scope of that duty of care. It is one thing to say that people have a certain
duty; it is quite another to say what that duty requires. Because fiduciary
duties vary widely with context and circumstances, there are strict limits
to the degree of specificity that any such inquiry can yield. But drawing
on principles of eighteenth-century fiduciary and corporate law, we can
at least begin to flesh out the extent to which the Constitution’s very
character purports to constrain the discretion of federal actors.
I. THE PRESIDENT’S DUTY OF CARE
The President of the United States presents perhaps the most obvious
case for construing constitutionally vested powers in light of background
principles of fiduciary law. All federal (and state) officials must “be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,”14 but only
the President has the precise content of the oath specified in the
Constitution: The President must swear an oath saying: “I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best
of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”15 Fiduciary duties, of both loyalty (“faithfully”) and care (“to the
best of my Ability”), are reflected in the constitutionally required oath of
12. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and
Reasonableness, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 9
(discussing the duties of care of the President and the federal courts required by the Constitution).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
15. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
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office. Accordingly, the President must exercise all of his powers as must
any other agent: with regard to the best interests of the beneficiary (in this
case “We the People” and “its posterity”), with impartiality among
multiple beneficiaries (as we have detailed elsewhere16), and with due
care. These are constitutional obligations to the extent that the
Constitution is an agency instrument that incorporates general
background rules of agency.17
The idea that executive officers, such as the President, might be
constitutionally bound to exercise due care, loyalty, and impartiality in
the exercise of their functions is not, or should not be, at all a startling
conclusion. We have previously reached essentially that same result
through a different path than we pursue here,18 though in the end the two
paths converge. The private-law background of agency that informs the
Constitution elegantly dovetails with a related public-law background of
obligations, such as those of due care, which we here summarize only
briefly. Through that public-law background, which began at least almost
two centuries before the Constitution was ratified, some basic principles
of agency law found their way into the legal norms regarding
governmental administration.
By the time of the framing of the Constitution, there was a substantial
body of English administrative law governing delegations of power to
governmental bodies. One of the most basic principles underlying this
law was the notion that grants of discretionary authority to executive
agents had to be exercised reasonably, even when that requirement was
not spelled out in the statutory grant of power.
This principle regarding the reasonable exercise of delegated
governmental power is typically traced to the 1598 decision in Rooke’s
Case.19 A statute gave sewer commissioners the power to assess
landowners for the costs of repairing water-control projects as the
commissioners “shall seme moste convenient to be ordeyned.”20 The
commissioner used this statute to assess the full costs of a repair on a
single landowner, even though other landowners were also benefited by
the project. The court ruled for the assessed landowner because

16. See generally Gary Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal
Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014).
17. When and whether constitutional violations of the duty of care are impeachable offenses
is a separate question that would require another article. We note the issue without resolving it.
18. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 13, at 143.
19. Rooke’s Case (1598) 77 Eng. Rep. 209; 5 Co. Rep. 99b. On Rooke’s Case as the
foundational authority for the interpretation of delegated powers, see WILLIAM WADE &
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 351–52 (9th ed. 2004).
20. 23 Hen. 8, c. V, § 3, cl. 3 (1531).
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notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority
to the commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet
their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule
of reason and law. For discretion is a science or
understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between
wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between
equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do
according to their wills and private affections . . . .21
Executive discretion, even when textually unlimited, had to be exercised
reasonably and in a disinterested and impartial fashion.
Other decisions applied a similar principle regarding exercise of even
very broadly worded grants of discretion in statutes. In Keighley’s Case22
in 1609, a statute authorizing a sewer commissioner to make rules “after
your own wisdoms and discretions” was held to require the agent to
exercise discretion “according to law and justice.”23 Other cases extended
the principle beyond sewer commissions to include all power delegated
by statute. Estwick v. City of London24 stated in 1647 that “wheresoever
a commissioner or other person [had] power given to do a thing at his
discretion, it is to be understood of sound discretion, and according to
law.”25 This constraint on the exercise of delegated executive power,
which in England eventually came to be called the principle of
reasonableness, was firmly established by the end of the seventeenth
century.26
The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated power
was powerfully reiterated on the eve of the founding in 1773 in Leader v.
Moxon.27 Paving commissioners, under a statute giving them power to
pave or repair streets “in such a manner as the commissioners shall think
fit,” ordered a road repair that effectively buried the doors and windows
of plaintiff’s house.28 In awarding damages to the homeowner, the court
wrote that the agents “had grossly exceeded their Powers, which must
have a reasonable construction. Their Discretion is not arbitrary, but must
be limited by Reason and Law.”29 The court explained: “[H]ad
Parliament intended to demolish or render useless some houses for the
Benefit or Ornament of the rest, it would have given express Powers for
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
1959).
27.
28.
29.

Rooke’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 210.
(1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138; 10 Co. Rep. 139a.
See id.
(1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 515, 516; Styles 42, 43.
Id. (emphasis added).
See STANLEY DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 168–69 (1st ed.
(1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 546; 2 Black W. 924.
Id. at 546.
Id.
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the Purpose, and given an Equivalent for the loss that Individuals might
have sustained thereby.”30
These implicit constraints on governmental discretion were simply
part of what it meant to exercise delegated public power. According to
these cases, discretion in governmental actors must be exercised
impartially (Rooke’s Case; Keighley’s Case), with attention to causal
efficacy (Keighley’s Case), in a measured and proportionate fashion
(Leader v. Moxon), and with regard for the rights of affected subjects
(Leader v. Moxon).31
To be sure, in English law the King (and Queen) had a special status—
the royal prerogative—that created considerable ambiguity about the
extent to which these norms applied to him (and her), and more
importantly about the extent to which various remedial mechanisms
applied in the event that one of the King’s subjects suffered a legal wrong
as a result of executive action (or inaction).32 One of us has canvassed at
length the shifting understandings of royal accountability in England
from Magna Carta through the eighteenth century,33 and we cannot
rehearse that extensive discussion here. Suffice it to say that we are aware
of very little support for extending to the American presidency a strong
immunity from responsibility for official misfeasance or nonfeasance.
Indeed, the fact that the Constitution specifically contemplates
impeachment and removal from office not only of subordinate executive
officials, as was the case in England, but also of the chief executive
himself,34 which English law did not recognize, makes clear that at least
some of the legal norms governing executive behavior bind the President.
We do not need to discuss here the remedies for executive misfeasance,
such as whether a writ of mandamus will properly lie against the
President.35 It is enough for us to say that the President is not above the
law and to move on, leaving questions of enforcement mechanisms (if
any) to another day.
Accordingly, when the federal Constitution vested “executive Power”
in the President,36 that grant of power carried with it the principle of
reasonableness in its implementation as a background principle of
30. Id. at 546–47.
31. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 13, at 120, 137–41 (elaborating the substantive
requirements of reasonableness contained in these cases).
32. Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the
Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 393, 396 (2005).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The Constitution uses a generic male pronoun to describe the
President. When referring to such constitutional provisions, we follow that practice without
endorsing it.
35. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1868) (saying “no”).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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interpretation. Crucially, the requirements of the principle of
reasonableness, as those requirements would have been understood in the
late eighteenth century, are a good proxy for basic fiduciary duties of
loyalty, care, and impartiality. That is not surprising. Given the powerful
tradition in English and American law of viewing government in
fiduciary terms, which is detailed at great length in our book and
elsewhere,37 there is every reason to think that the principle of
reasonableness in English administrative law is simply agency law
applied to a governmental context in which the actual instruction or will
of the principal is difficult to ascertain but the general sentiment in favor
of “proper” and “reasonable” conduct is easier to grasp. Whether one
calls it fiduciary duty or the principle of reasonableness, the result is the
same: While the President, as with any agent, has a range of choices in
the means used to carry out constitutionally assigned tasks, the choice is
limited by background principles that render some means of law
execution off-limits. As we have said elsewhere:
Could the president, exercising discretion in the selection of
forms and means of law enforcement, apprehend a suspect
holed up in Concord by leveling the entire town . . . ? Could
the president in 1790, prior to ratification of the Fourth
Amendment, exercise discretionary investigative powers by
indiscriminately searching an entire region? We think that
all of these measures would be not merely ill-advised, but
unconstitutional.38
The key point is that agency law, developed in English private law
and then applied by England’s royal courts to public agents as well,
suggests serious legal limits on the manner in which the Constitution
expects executive agents to carry out their tasks. It also suggests that
when engaging in permissible sub-delegation, the President must exercise
due care in the selection of sub-agents as well as in the decision to subdelegate in the first place. The power to sub-delegate, after all, is not a
duty to sub-delegate. If the task is best done by the agent personally
(where “best” incorporates the idea of opportunity costs), then the agent
must personally perform the task. That is not simply wise administrative
policy. It is constitutional law.
We thus think that there is a sound foundation in the fiduciary
character of the Constitution for something resembling Professor Gillian
37. See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077,
1083 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The Constitution]; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of
Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders,
11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 245 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Judicial Review].
38. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 13, at 132–33.
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Metzger’s elaboration of a constitutional duty of presidential supervision
of subordinates.39 Metzger correctly points out that modern law and
scholarship tend to focus on questions of the President’s right to
supervise subordinates rather than questions of the President’s duty to
supervise.40 Even if one cannot derive that duty directly from provisions
such as the Take Care Clause41 and the Oath Clause,42 the fiduciary
character of the Constitution and the accompanying fiduciary character
of the grant of executive power to the President are sufficient to provide
a constitutional foundation for viewing the President as a constrained
agent rather than a free actor.
None of that says, of course, what the President’s duty of care entails
in specific circumstances. As we have intimated, there may not be a
general answer to that kind of question, given the contextual character of
agency relationships.43 We will say more about the broad outlines of a
constitutionally grounded fiduciary duty of care when we get to Congress
shortly.
II. FEDERAL JUDGES’ DUTY OF CARE
What about federal judges? Are they also subject to fiduciary duties
because they exercise a delegated “judicial Power”44? Of course they are.
Other scholars have tried to use agency theory to formulate a general
theory of judging in the American political order,45 but we are not going
that far. We are only trying to interpret the meaning of the “judicial
Power” in the context of the federal Constitution. And in that context,
agency law has much to say:
Suppose that a federal judge exercises his or her delegated
power to decide a case by consulting an Ouija board. The
judge’s decision could certainly be reversed on appeal. The
judge could certainly be impeached and removed by
Congress. But more profoundly, the judge has violated the
Constitution. There is nothing in Article III that expressly
says that judges must decide cases rationally or sensibly, but
39. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J.
1836 (2015) (discussing the President’s duty of supervision).
40. See id. at 1875.
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”).
42. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. For arguments that one can indeed
derive such a duty from those provisions, see Metzger, supra note 39, at 1875–78; see also David
M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83–87
(2009). We do not disagree with these arguments. We simply maintain that they are subsumed
under, and superseded by, the more basic point about the fiduciary character of the Constitution.
43. See Metzger, supra note 39, at 1901.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
45. See generally Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
699 (2013) (analyzing the role of fiduciary duties in the context of the judiciary).
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given the eighteenth-century background norms regarding
delegated governmental power, there would be no need for
such a specification. Courts are delegated the judicial power,
which includes as a necessary element the discretionary
power to choose a decision-making methodology. It would
simply be taken as given by a founding-era reasonable
observer that the delegation to the courts, although
seemingly without any internal textual limit, carries the
implicit requirement that the power be exercised reasonably.
There is substantial room within that grant of power for
different methodologies, and even substantial room for error
that does not rise to a constitutional violation, but at some
point a judgment falls so far off the map that it simply ceases
to be an exercise of the judicial power. Put another way: Not
everything done by a judge, even in the guise of deciding a
case, is an exercise of judicial power (or jurisdiction) within
the meaning of Article III. The limits may be broad, but there
are limits.46
As we noted above, Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota
have argued that all American judges, both state and federal, are subject
to basic fiduciary duties, and they have sought to derive a robust theory
of proper behavior from the nature of the judicial role as established in
England and the North American colonies (if not more widely). They
seek to identify “fiduciary duties that . . . are widely applicable to all
judges.”47 We do not disagree with their general characterization of the
role of judges; after all, until fairly recently in Anglo–American legal
history judges were considered a kind of executive official, and we have
just seen that there is a long tradition of holding executive officials to
fiduciary standards. We agree that fiduciary principles are a powerful
way in which to ground familiar ideals of judicial impartiality48 and
responsibility.49 We are less persuaded that one can derive a judicial duty
of “deliberative engagement” with the public.50 Federal judges are
charged with a very specific task—deciding cases or controversies in
accordance with governing law—and it is far from obvious how
deliberative engagement with the public uniformly promotes that task.
But in this Article we do not claim principles beyond those that we have
identified here as applicable to federal judges by virtue of their
46. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 13, at 132; see also Gary Lawson, Take the
Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 629–31 (describing founding-era understandings of the “judicial
Power”).
47. Leib et al., supra note 45, at 730.
48. Id. at 731–33.
49. Id. at 736–39.
50. Id. at 740–52.
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constitutional office. Such broader principles may well exist, but we do
not claim them here. And again, the scope of the appropriate duty of care
requires more explanation.
We shall now see, in the context of Congress, how much guidance one
can draw about that duty from background principles of agency law.
III. CONGRESS’S DUTY OF CARE
The principle of reasonableness in English administrative law applied
to agents exercising authority delegated from Parliament, but Parliament
itself was not bound by that principle because Parliament did not exercise
delegated authority; it was supreme. “Indeed, the law imposed no
substantive limits, of reasonableness or otherwise, on the legislative
supremacy of Parliament, which stood above the other two governmental
departments in the legal hierarchy.”51
Under the American Constitution, however, Congress exercises
delegated authority just as does the President and the federal judiciary.52
Once it is seen that the Constitution is fundamentally an agency
instrument, there is no reason to exempt some of the designated agents
from the background norms that accompany agency instruments absent
some specific provision in the instrument that explicitly overrides those
background norms. Accordingly, it is evident that Congress is also bound
by a duty of care when it exercises discretionary authority. If an agent is
charged with managing or spending another person’s money, of course
the agent must exercise due care when dealing with those assets.
Congress manages money—a staggeringly enormous amount of
money—on behalf of the People and its posterity. The idea that Congress
has a duty of care when executing that task, and its other constitutionally
delegated tasks, is almost too elementary to articulate.
Put in interpretative terms, all of the power grants in the Constitution
come with an implicit coda to the effect of: “to be exercised in a
reasonable fashion in accordance with basic fiduciary norms.” The
fiduciary duty of care is part of the interpretative background of the
document. The real question for us concerns the scope and content of that
duty.53
In our book, we spend considerable energy discussing whether the
Constitution is best seen as a kind of power of attorney or as some other
kind of fiduciary instrument, such as a corporate charter. There are strong
similarities between the Constitution and corporate charters of the
51. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 13, at 134–35 (footnote omitted).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
53. Others may be equally or more interested in the mechanisms, if any, by which those
duties are enforced. Expulsion? Judicial review? Electoral results? We do not address those
potentially important questions of institutional governance in this Article.
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eighteenth century, so we readily concede that the case for viewing the
Constitution in corporate terms is quite powerful,54 though in the end we
think less powerful than the case for viewing it as a power of attorney. It
is an intriguing question whether the precise characterization of the
Constitution as a specific kind of fiduciary instrument might make a
difference in the content of the norm of due care. In the end, we think that
it most likely does not matter, but the considerations involved are subtle
enough to warrant a close look, especially as those considerations point
towards the appropriate standard of care that is incorporated into the
Constitution as a background rule of interpretation.
Suppose that one thinks that the Constitution can best be analogized
to a corporate charter. In that case, one might reason that agents such as
Congress are best viewed as corporate directors who determine the
general path of the enterprise (and executive and judicial officials might
be analogized to managers, though they might fit the role of directors as
well for certain designated tasks). Under basic principles of modern-day
corporate law, the directors are subject to fiduciary duties of care, but
their exercise of discretionary judgment is evaluated pursuant to the socalled business judgment rule, in which there is
a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company. A hallmark of the
business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board if the latter’s decision can be
“attributed to any rational business purpose.”55
This suggests that the constitutionally implied duty of care, while quite
real, is highly deferential to the extent that such a duty conforms to
contemporary practice under corporate law. But from the standpoint of
original meaning, contemporary practice is not the place to look for the
appropriate duty of care. One must look instead to eighteenth-century
baselines. Would the eighteenth-century duty of care of fiduciaries under
corporate law, a power of attorney, or other kind of fiduciary instrument
be more constraining than the minimalist modern corporate law standard
of care?

54. For enlightening expositions of that case in various contexts, see Mary Sarah Bilder,
The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Eric Enlow, The Corporate
Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 9, at 144.
55. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citations omitted).
For a brief overview of the modern business judgment rule, see Mary Siegel, The Illusion of
Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 602–08 (2013).
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This is a much more difficult question to answer than it might at first
seem. Our present bottom line is that the duty of care that forms an
interpretative backdrop for understanding all constitutionally vested
powers is in fact approximated reasonably well by the modern business
judgment rule. It is possible for decisions of governmental actors to be so
far outside the normal range of discretion that they amount to a breach of
this bedrock fiduciary duty, but the standard is much more forgiving than
one of simple error, and it probably does not even reach the “prudent
person” standard that modern fiduciary law would likely apply to a wide
range of contemporary agency relationships. But, as we will shortly see,
that does not necessarily make the standard equivalent to so-called
“rational basis” analysis under current constitutional doctrine. The
business judgment rule, today and in the eighteenth century, is highly
deferential, but it is not a free pass.
Start with the eighteenth-century duty of care of fiduciaries outside of
the corporate setting. The law in that regard seems to have been relatively
thin. Partly that is a function of the splintered character in earlier times of
what today we call fiduciary law, which did not exist as a unified, unitary
body of doctrine in the founding era. Executors, guardians, and factors,
for example, each had their own standards to meet, and generalizing
across those standards is difficult, in part because cases are likely to turn
on the language of particular instruments and the specific facts presented.
Professor Robert Natelson has studied this question of founding-era
fiduciary standards for far longer and in far more depth than we have, and
he concludes regarding the common threads among the various
eighteenth-century understandings of duties of care:
The “reasonable man” standard seems not to have been in
use yet, but the duty was expressed as an obligation not to
neglect the business nor to be guilty of “folly or negligence”
or, in some cases, as an obligation to avoid “supine” or
“extreme” negligence or crassa neglegentia (gross
negligence). If a fiduciary acted in an “unreasonable or
indiscrete” way, a court . . . also could hold fiduciaries
liable . . . .56
This relatively deferential standard actually makes a great deal of sense
for an era in which fiduciaries were often not professionals but were
simply ordinary citizens acting as executors, guardians, and the like.57 An
overly strict standard of care would make serving in those positions very
risky, and the social costs of discouraging people from serving in those
fiduciary capacities would have been enormous. A “business judgment”
56. Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 37, at 258–59 (footnotes omitted).
57. See Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 9, at 52, 56.
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rule as a baseline, from which any instrument could, if it so chose, depart
in either direction, is an understandable first approximation of a
generalized fiduciary standard of care in the eighteenth century.
Was that business judgment norm also the eighteenth-century
standard of care for corporate directors and officers, so that the
interpretative result would be the same whether one sees the Constitution
as a power of attorney or as a corporate charter?58 That is an even harder
question to answer because there appears to be relatively little foundingera law on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. The corporation
itself was a fiduciary for its owners, and was even deemed to hold the
stock of its owners as a trustee.59 The corporate stock was treated, for
legal purposes, as an asset of the corporation, and the stockholders were
beneficiaries of the resulting equitable trust.60 The idea that the stock
actually belongs to the stockholders rather than the corporate entity did
not gain broad acceptance until the early nineteenth century.61
This conception of the corporation as an owner and trustee came out
in 1723 in Child v. Hudson’s Bay Co.,62 in which both the corporation
and an outside creditor made claims on the stock of a bankrupt
stockholder. The corporation had a by-law stating that if any member
(stockholder) of the company incurred a debt to the corporation, the stock
was to be used first to satisfy the debt to the corporation.63 The outside
creditor denied that the corporation could, through a by-law, effectively
make itself a secured creditor.64 The court ruled in favor of the
corporation: “This is a good bye-law; for the legal interest of all the stock
is in the company, who are trustees for the several members . . . .”65 Once
the company is identified as a trustee, then of course background
fiduciary principles come into play. We have, however, found little
elaboration of the content of those principles in the corporate law context,
especially in regard to the duty of care.

58. We are assuming that the standard of care for corporate directors and officers is
substantially similar. We gather that this assumption is not as straightforward as it might seem to
outsiders to corporate law. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in
Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 27, 29 (2010)
(indicating that Delaware courts did not equate director and officer fiduciary duties until 2009 and
suggesting that the scopes of the relevant duties of care remain uncertain).
59. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 149, 149–50 (1888).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. (1723) 24 Eng. Rep. 702.
63. Id. at 702.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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In addition, there was some eighteenth-century authority for imposing
fiduciary duties directly on the directors and officers of corporations in
their personal capacities. The most illuminating case that we have
identified is Charitable Corporation v. Sutton.66 The case concerned a
massive fraud against the company, which had been created as a lending
institution, perpetrated by some of its officers. Thompson, the company’s
warehouse keeper, was the officer at the center of the fraud, which
involved issuing loans (often to the officer himself) far in excess of the
company’s assets.67 Thompson had “run away out of the kingdom in
order to avoid justice,” and the company sought to hold the committeemen, who would be the equivalent of modern directors, liable for the
losses.68 There were allegations of nonfeasance in failing to monitor the
situation and for malfeasance in appointing some of the perpetrators to
positions of authority.69 The basic claim of the plaintiffs, as described by
the court, was that the defendant committee-men “have been guilty of
manifest breaches of trust, or at least of such supine and gross negligence
of their duty, and so often repeated, that it will amount to a breach of
trust.”70
The court found the committee-men clearly liable for “actual breaches
of trust” for several events:
The bye-law prescribes, that when notes were to be issued
by the cashier, they should be signed by one of the
committee-men, and intended as a check upon the
warehouse-keeper and cashier.
Now several notes have been issued, without observing this
rule, which is an express contravention of the bye-law.
A registry of pledges was kept, in which an entry is made of
the value of the goods pawned: after this was done, a new
loan is made upon the same pledge, to the same person, and
a reference to the old number in the registry upon every new
advance; so that it may be called a pedigree of loans through
twenty descents.
Now it is not in the nature of the thing possible to suppose,
that the same person wanting to re-borrow could replace the

66. (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642.
67. The corporation’s charter specifically forbade this kind of fractional-reserve banking.
See id. (noting that the corporate charter “restrains the company from banking, unless with notes
payable on demand, and confined within the amount of the stock”).
68. Id. at 643.
69. Id. at 643–44.
70. Id. at 643.
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first money lent; and therefore at the out-set was a plain and
obvious fraud.
....
As to the third breach of trust, the committee-men’s
behavior, with regard to Thompson their warehouse-keeper.
It is such a notorious fraud, or at least gross inattention, to
suffer him, who was to set a value on all the pledges, to
borrow money upon them himself; that, I shall direct those
who shall appear to be guilty of it to make good the loss.71
“Gross inattention” in supervision thus amounted to a breach of trust.
Other charges of breach of trust against the committee-men alleged
what amounts to mismanagement. The original design of the corporation
included an officer “called the surveyor of the warehouse, whose business
it was to examine all the pledges taken in by the warehouse-keeper.”72
However, “[i]n September 1726, the surveyor of the warehouse was
discharged, and there was never any appointed afterwards; so that all the
checks upon the warehouse-keeper were taken away.”73 The removal of
the mechanism for oversight of Thompson was alleged to be a breach of
trust. So was “making several orders to put it in the power of Thompson,
Woolley, and Warren, to commit those frauds.”74 Though these “are not
so clearly breaches of trust,” the court found that those who “issued out
the orders, which invested Thompson, Woolley, and Warren, with such
powers” would be liable.75
Even more interesting are the charges against the committee-men for
crassa negligentia, or gross negligence in modern parlance. Those claims
were founded on
1st, The committee-men’s non-attendance upon their
employment. 2dly, Their not observing the bye-law of law
of laying the balance of cash regularly before them. 3dly,
Not taking any notice of forfeited pledges. 4thly, Never once
inspecting the warehouse to see what number of real pledges
were there. 5thly, Putting the whole power into the hands of
Thompson, Woolley, and Warren.76
The court determined that “committee-men are most properly agents to
those who employ them in this trust, and who empower them to direct
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 644.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
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and superintend the affairs of the corporation.”77 Accordingly, the
committee-men were under a duty of care to the corporation and its
owners. But in what reads like an early anticipation of the business
judgment rule, the court observed:
Now where acts are executed within their authority, as
repealing bye-laws and making orders, in such cases though
attended with bad consequences, it will be very difficult to
determine that these are breaches of trust. For it is by no
means just in a judge, after bad consequences have arisen
from such executions of their power, to say that they foresaw
at the time what must necessarily happen; and therefore were
guilty of a breach of trust.78
This is a very deferential standard. There is language in the opinion
suggesting something a bit less deferential: “By accepting of a trust of
this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable
diligence . . . .”79 The ultimate standard, however, was whether “there
should appear to be a supine negligence . . . [in] not making use of the
proper power invested in them by the charter, in order to prevent the ill
consequences arising from such a confederacy.”80
Although “[n]o case seems to have arisen in the United States during
the period from 1800 to 1830 in which the principles of fiduciary law
were applied to the directors or officers of business corporations,”81 we
see no reason to think that American law was materially different from
English law in these respects. Professor Edwin Merrick Dodd, in his
extensive study of early American corporate law, had
no doubt that American lawyers and judges of the period
with which we are concerned were well aware of the fact that
English law had long insisted that persons who act for others
in such capacities as agents, partners, trustees, guardians,
executors, or administrators must observe a high standard of
loyalty to those whose property interests have been entrusted
to their charge.82
The best summary that we can exact from these materials is that
eighteenth-century fiduciaries generally, whether attorneys or corporate
directors, had a duty of care as a baseline part of their obligations, but
that the standard of care that could be legally enforced was akin to a
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id.
EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860,
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 70 (1954).
82. Id.
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standard of gross negligence. To the extent that the Constitution is a
fiduciary instrument, of any plausible kind to which it can be analogized,
federal actors must exercise their discretion at least in accordance with
this standard.
Interestingly, that conclusion is not very far removed from ideas that
are central to modern constitutional law, though modern law does not
ground its principles in fiduciary notions or conform to them precisely.
The contemporary business judgment rule in corporate law is often cast
as a “rational basis” test, in which the decision of a board of directors will
be upheld if it “can be attributed to any rational business purpose,”83
though the standard is also sometimes framed as one of “gross
negligence,” as was the evident eighteenth-century standard.84 For
students of American constitutional law, the term “rational basis” has
immediate resonance.
In 1938, the Supreme Court famously declared that congressional
legislation that did not implicate certain judicially favored interests
(which today are generally called “fundamental rights”) “is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known
or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.”85 Four years earlier, in a case involving
state rather than federal legislation, the Court said: “If the laws passed are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied.”86 The clear implication is that legislation is to be pronounced
unconstitutional if it cannot be assumed to rest upon a rational basis or to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. That is, the
implication is that there is a general background norm of rationality with
which any legislation must comply. While it may be difficult to find
legislation that is so absurd that it will not sustain a presumption of
legislative rationality (just as it may be difficult to find business decisions
so preposterous that no presumption of responsible judgment can be
indulged with respect to them), it is not impossible to do so. The Supreme
Court has even found a federal statute refusing to recognize state
definitions of marriage that include same-sex couples to be irrational and
therefore invalid,87 though the case obviously implicated other, more
83. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
85. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). On the exception for
favored rights, see id. at 152 n.4.
86. Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). For a brief account of the
Supreme Court’s rational basis jurisprudence, see Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055, 1058–60 (2014).
87. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
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particularized concerns even if the decision did not precisely identify
them. Numerous cases announce the rational basis standard while finding
it satisfied.
It is very difficult to find a textual hook for this kind of “rational basis
review,” as it has come to be called. The cases involving action by state
officials typically invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but even if that was a plausible ground for such a
requirement in the context of state actors, there is no express Equal
Protection Clause applicable to the federal government.88 Certainly the
Due Process of Law Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unlikely home
for it, for reasons that have oft been given about the implausibility of
“substantive due process” as an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.89
The background duty of care imposed by fiduciary theory, however,
just might fit the bill. Indeed, the eighteenth-century duty of care may
even be slightly more rigorous than modern “rational basis” review,
though that is hard to glean with any confidence from the eighteenthcentury law. The founding-era cases support a fiduciary standard of gross
negligence. Modern rational basis inquiry excuses even gross negligence;
it allows laws to stand if one can imagine a rationale for them, even if the
actors did not actually formulate or rely upon that rationale.90 Agency law
arguably demands a bit more than modern rational basis inquiry provides.
In any event, once government actors are seen as fiduciaries of any sort,
the idea that their actions are entirely unconstrained by law other than
express prohibitions in the governing instrument is quite absurd. Any
such result would have to come from an explicit statement in a document
that the governing background law of fiduciary instruments was
superseded. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution even resembling
88. That does not mean that there is no general equality norm applicable to federal action.
It just means that such a norm must derive, as does the reasonableness requirement that we discuss
here, from the fiduciary character of the Constitution. See Lawson et al., supra note 16, at 419.
89. See, e.g., ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION: WHAT IT ACTUALLY
SAID AND MEANT 167–70 (2d. ed. 2011); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493 (1997); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive
Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010). As Professor Williams makes clear, it is possible
that there is a stronger case for “substantive due process” as an interpretation of the midnineteenth-century Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Williams,
supra, at 416. As we emphasize in our concluding remarks, nothing that we say in this Article
bears on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is little to be said for such an
interpretation of the late-eighteenth-century Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause
independent of that clause’s possible reflection of the fiduciary principles implicit in the
Constitution’s original text. For more on the possible relationship between fiduciary principles
and the Fifth Amendment, see generally Lawson, supra note 46, at 644–46 (discussing how
fiduciary principles play a role in the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment).
90. See Clark Neily, Litigation Without Adjudication: Why the Modern Rational Basis Test
Is Unconstitutional, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 543–48 (2016).
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such a provision. Substantive due process may well be an implausible
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, but, from the standpoint of
original meaning, some kind of rational basis review of federal legislation
has a very potent constitutional pedigree. And, as we have seen, the case
for imposing such a standard on federal executive and judicial officials is
at least as strong. If Congress is bound by fiduciary standards, then a
fortiori so are the President and federal judges.
The reasonableness requirement of fiduciary law also suggests that
there is no good reason to think that executive officials should be held to
a lower standard of rationality than are legislators, as modern case law
would have it.91 Federal actors are all agents, each charged with specific
tasks. The nature of the tasks lead to differences in the application of
fiduciary standards, but it is far from obvious that some tasks call for a
lower standard than others,92 just as it is far from obvious that corporate
officers should be subject to a different fiduciary standard than corporate
directors.
CONCLUSION
The idea that federal governmental action should, as an ideal, be
reasonable is not especially controversial. But finding a textually
grounded constitutional basis for turning that desideratum into an actual
legal norm has been a different story. Once the Constitution is seen as an
agency instrument, however, the requirement of reasonableness follows
quite easily as a matter of original meaning—not from a specific textual
provision but from the nature of the text itself. One does not need the
possibly oxymoronic label “substantive due process”93 to describe this
reasonableness requirement. It derives from the basic fiduciary duty of
care.
We hasten to add that it is an entirely different question from those
that we address here whether state laws or state executive or judicial
officials are subject to a constitutionally grounded reasonableness review.
Modern law unquestionably subjects state actors to some such standard
via the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is not at all clear that this practice
is (or is not) constitutionally grounded under our analysis. Because the
Constitution does not generally empower state officials and state
legislators (with some modest exceptions94), those actors are not subject
91. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
92. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13
CHAPMAN L. REV. 307, 308 (2010).
93. See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253,
264, 270, 276–77 (2016) (collecting references that decry the term as oxymoronic).
94. There are a number of contexts, primarily involving federal elections and constitutional
amendments, in which state officials get their authority to act from delegations from the federal
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to the background fiduciary standards that underlie the federal
Constitution when they act within the compass of their state authority. It
is possible that their own state constitutions impose those standards, but
that is something that would have to be determined on a state-by-state
basis. It is also possible that, while substantive due process is a very tough
sell under the Fifth Amendment, it might be a more plausible
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that was enacted in 1868.95
We take no position on that question.
Thus, it is compatible with everything that we have said here to
maintain either (1) that there is no general rationality requirement for
state action, (2) that there is a general rationality requirement for state
action that is equivalent to the requirement for federal action, (3) that
there is a general rationality requirement for state action that is stricter
than the requirement for federal action, or (4) that there is a general
rationality requirement for state action that is less demanding than the
requirement for federal action. Choosing among those alternatives
involves matters well beyond the scope of our analysis, which is confined
to a study of the Constitution of 1788. Our claim here is only that, as a
matter of original meaning, some kind of general requirement of
reasonableness for federal action, whether cast as a modestly revamped
“rational basis” review or as akin to a “business judgment” rule, is a
background interpretative norm of the Constitution of 1788.96 Whether
one calls this background norm “substantive due process” or anything
else is a matter of taste.

Constitution. In those limited contexts, fiduciary analysis would apply to state officials to the
same extent that it applies to federal officials.
95. Compare Williams, supra note 89, at 416 (arguing in favor of this view), with Nathan
S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J.
1672, 1777–78 (2012) (arguing that “there is nothing in the legislative or ratification history of
the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest that it was understood to operate against states any
differently than due process clauses had since the early days of the Republic”).
96. For an argument that is much to the same effect, from a very different interpretative
perspective, see Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 281 (2015).
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